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Nontechnical Summary
The Olympic Games usually involve substantial infrastructure investment and boost tourism to the
host country. Therefore, the economic impact of the Olympic Games usually receives broad public
alertness. However, a full evaluation of this economic impact is rather difficult, since such a mega
event has short term and long term, as well as direct and indirect effects, which complicates the
estimation of its costs and benefits.
Stock market provides an alternative way of evaluating the economic impact of Olympic Games.
The stock market, a barometer of the economy, is commonly believed to reflect the expectations
for the economic outlook. Mega sports events are usually perceived to positively affect the host
countries’ economy. Hence, the announcement of the host city by the International Olympic Com-
mittee should result in a positive reaction of the stock market of the country which is awarded the
sports event (“winner country") and in a negative one in those of their unsuccessful competitors
(“losing countries").
This paper studies the stock market reactions to the announcement of the Olympic Games host
cities during the last three decades. We find a significant and positive announcement effect of host-
ing the Summer Games which is reflected in the returns (additional 2 percent cumulated over the
following days). We do not find any significant results for the Winter Games. Neither do we detect
a significant impact when bidders lose the competition. Our results differ from those of a similar
study by Mirman and Sharma (2008), who find that the Winter Games are subject to a significantly
negative announcement impact, while the Summer Games are not. Our results, however, rely on
a larger sample of 15 Olympic events and are obtained by assessing the observed returns after the
announcement against a “business–as–usual" situation (instead of testing the difference between
the winner group and the loser group).
Our findings are in line with economic intuition, since the Summer Games are larger than the
Winter Games and are thus more likely to have a significant impact. We also find that among the
winners, small economies tend to have greater cumulative abnormal returns than their large peers.
Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Üblicherweise führen die Olympischen Spiele zu maßgeblichen Infrastrukturinvestitionen wie auch
zu erhöhtem Tourismus im Gastgeberland. Nicht zuletzt deshalb wird den ökonomischen Auswir-
kungen der Olympiade in der Öffentlichkeit breite Beachtung geschenkt. Eine vollständige Bewer-
tung des wirtschaftlichen Einflusses von Olympischen Spielen ist jedoch recht kompliziert, da ein
solches Großereignis kurzfristige sowie langfristige direkte und indirekte Effekte mit sich bringt.
Der Aktienmarkt bietet eine Alternative, um die ökonomischen Auswirkungen von Olympischen
Spielen zu bewerten. Er gilt als Barometer der Volkswirtschaft, der die Geschäftserwartungen eines
Landes reflektiert. Große Sportereignisse scheinen oft die Wirtschaft der Gastgeberländer positiv
zu beeinflussen. Entsprechend sollte die Ankündigung des Internationalen Olympischen Kommi-
tees, welche Stadt die Spiele ausrichten darf, positive Reaktionen auf dem Aktienmarkt des betref-
fenden Landes ("Gewinner") sowie negative Reaktionen auf denen der unterlegenen Konkurrenten
("Verlierer") auslösen. Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Aktienmarktreaktionen auf die Ankündigung
der olympischen Gastgeberstädte in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten. Wir finden signifikante und posi-
tive Ankündigungseffekte für die Gastgeberländer der Sommerspiele, welche sich in den Renditen
(über die Folgetage kumuliert etwa zusätzliche 2 Prozent) bemerkbar machen. Für die Winterspiele
finden wir ebenso wenig signifikante Ergebnisse wie für die unterlegenen Kandidaten des Wettbe-
werbs um die Ausrichtung. Unsere Ergebnisse unterscheiden sich von denen einer ähnlichen Studie
von Mirman and Sharma (2008), die für die Winterspiele einen signifikant negativen Effekt sowie
keinen Effekt für die Sommerspiele entdecken. Unsere Ergebnisse stützen sich mit 15 Olympiaden
auf eine größere Grundgesamtheit und beurteilen die beobachteten Renditen im Vergleich zu der
Situation gewöhnlicher Marktaktivität (statt den Unterschied zwischen Gewinnern und Verlierern
zu testen). Unsere Ergebnisse entsprechen der ökonomischen Intuition, da die Sommerspiele grö-
ßer als die Winterspiele sind und deswegen ein merklicher Effekt wahrscheinlicher ist. Wir stellen
ebenfalls fest, dass innerhalb der Gewinnerländer kleine Volkswirtschaften eher höhere kumulierte
abnormale Renditen haben als größere.
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Abstract
By means of an event study of stock market reactions to the announcement of the Olympic
Games host cities, we find a significant and positive announcement effect of hosting the Sum-
mer Games, with a cumulative abnormal return of about 2% within a few days. We do not
find any significant results for the Winter Games. Neither do we detect a significant impact
when bidders lose the competition. Our results differ from those of a similar study by Mirman
and Sharma (2008), who find that the Winter Games are subject to a significantly negative an-
nouncement impact, while the Summer Games are not. Our results, however, rely on a larger
sample of 15 Olympic events and are obtained by assessing the abnormal returns after the an-
nouncement against a “business–as–usual" situation (instead of testing the difference between
winner group and loser group). Our findings are in line with economic intuition, since the
Summer Games represent a larger event and are thus more likely to have a significant im-
pact. We also find that among the winners, small economies tend to have greater cumulative
abnormal returns than their large peers.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the stock market reaction to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) an-
nouncement of the host cities of the Olympic Games in the past three decades by means of an
event study. Mega sports events are usually perceived to positively affect the host countries’ econ-
omy. Since stock markets are assumed to reflect the expectations for the economic outlook, the
announcement of the host city should result in a positive reaction in the winner’s stock market and
in a negative one in those of their losing competitors1.
Different studies are devoted to identifying the direct, indirect and induced economic impacts
of the Olympic Games (for a survey, see Kasimati 2003). Instead of discussing the effects on
various macroeconomic variables, our study focuses on stock prices, which presumably reflect the
business expectations for the respective countries. The reaction of stock markets to the Olympic
Games announcement has been investigated in single-event case studies by Berman, Brooks, and
Davidson (2000) and Veraros, Kasimati, and Dawson (2004). The former contribution focuses on
the announcement of the 2000 Olympic Summer Games and its impact on the Australian stock
market, whereas the latter discusses stock price movements in Greece and Italy after the IOC
decision in favor of Athens (instead of Rome) for 2004. Statistical analysis which applies event
study methodology makes it possible to go beyond the scope of investigating single events and
to draw inference on different observations. Martins and Serra (2007) perform a broad study on
mega events, including Olympic Games, to discuss hypotheses about rational and behavioral asset
pricing theories.2 Mirman and Sharma (2008) investigate the stock market impact for the 1996
to 2010 Olympic Games, comparing the stock market reaction of winners and losers around the
announcement date. They find that, for the Winter Games announcement, stock markets in winning
countries perform significantly worse than in losing countries, while there are insignificant results
1“Winner" refers to the country/ the city that is awarded the Olympic Games, whereas “loser" refers to a bidding
country which does not succeed with its candidacy
2Their reported results for the individual events, however, substantially differ from Mirman and Sharma’s (2008)
findings as well as the ones from our analysis.
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for the Summer Games.
To assess the economic impact of the Olympic Games expected by market participants, Mirman
and Sharma (2008) test for the difference between winners and losers. That methodology depends
on the chosen group of losers. Indeed, stock market reactions are expected to differ across losing
countries with respect to the ex-ante probability of winning the announcement. For example, no
negative announcement effects should be expected for those ex-post losers who have very low ex-
ante probabilities of winning the competition. Therefore, there will presumably be a difference in
the results when comparing the group of the winners to the one of the losers if the latter is composed
by all losing cities or only by those with the highest ex-ante winning probability. We circumvent
this difficulty by testing the abnormal returns of winning and losing countries separately. That is,
we assess the economic impact by comparing the market reactions after a (positive or negative)
IOC announcement with the “business–as–usual" situation. We also consider a group of “first
losers" (those ranked in the second place in the last round of the competition). The ex-post ranking
of IOC voting results are used as a proxy for the ex-ante probability of winning the competition.
First losers are expected to be affected by the negative news of the IOC decision in a stronger way
than the other losers.
On the basis of a more comprehensive data set than used before (15 Summer Games or Winter
Games), we find insignificant overall results for the Winter Games. In contrast, for the successful
applicant for the Summer Games, we find positive and significant results. Yet we do not find sig-
nificant results for the losers of the competition. These results also hold true when only the first
losers are considered. Our results are in line with economic intuition: The Summer Games are big-
ger and therefore more likely to have a significantly positive impact; since the Winter Games have
a smaller scale3, markets might not react clearly enough to indicate a significant impact. Based on
a cross sectional analysis of all Olympic host cities, the abnormal returns after the announcement
tend to be higher in small economies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the event study
methodology applied in our paper. Section 3 reports the empirical results of our investigation.
3For example, the 2004 Summer Games had 10,500 participants, as opposed to the 2006 Winter Games with only
2,633.
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Section 4 concludes.
2 Methodology
MacKinlay’s (1997) event study methodology provides a frequently applied framework to identify
abnormal returns which are triggered by surprising upcoming information in the stock market.
In order to disentangle abnormal returns from usual fluctuations in the stock market, the market
model makes use of the statistical relationship between a market portfolio (represented by, e.g., a
national stock market index) and the considered security. The present analysis uses a market model
given by
Rit = αi + βiRmt + it, E(it) = 0, Var(it) = σ2i (1)
where Rit represents the log- return of market i (measured by the national stock indices) and Rmt the
log- return of the world portfolio.4 The parameters αˆi, βˆi and σˆ2i are estimated for the estimation
window from T0 = −241 to T1 = −41 days before the respective announcement of the IOC
decision.
Assuming that these coefficients are stable over time, the abnormal returns for the event window
can be computed by ARiτ = Riτ − αˆi − βˆiRmτ, where ARiτ denotes the abnormal returns of market i
at point τ during the event window.
The assessment of overall market reactions to an IOC decision announcement needs to be based
on several observations. First the observations are grouped according to their properties (e.g.
winning/loosing cities). Within each group of interest, the average cumulated abnormal returns
can be computed by
CAR(τ1, τ2) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
CARi(τ1, τ2) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
τ2∑
τ=τ1
ARiτ, (2)
4Mirman and Sharma (2008) propose the inclusion of an AR(1) term as well as of day-of-the-week dummy vari-
ables. The Durbin Watson statistic indicates that the errors do not exhibit high autocorrelation. Even if an AR–term
is included, we find the results for small event windows to be qualitatively similar. Since event windows larger than
[0,1] include different days, day-of-the-week dummies are redundant if the results for different event windows are in
line.
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where CARi(τ1, τ2) is the cumulated abnormal returns of a single event. Since these have the
asymptotic variance σ2i (τ1, τ2) = (τ2 − τ1 + 1)σ2i , the total variance of the average cumulated
abnormal returns can be computed by
var(CAR(τ1, τ2)) =
1
N2
N∑
i=1
σ2i (τ1, τ2). (3)
The null hypothesis that the cumulated abnormal returns are equal to zero can then be tested by the
test statistic
CAR(τ1, τ2)√
var(CAR(τ1, τ2))
∼ N(0, 1). (4)
3 Empirical Results
Information about candidacies for hosting the Olympic Games can be obtained from www.olympic.org.
It is important to note that this source only includes the countries which were still participating in
the competition at the announcement date. Since it is unlikely that the stock market is affected in
countries which have had to leave the selection process at an earlier stage, they are excluded from
the analysis. We also exclude Yugoslavia (announcement in 1986 and 1990), Bulgaria (1986,1988)
and Sweden (1981), whose stock market indices were unavailable in the announcement year. The
ex-post information about the IOC voting results is used as a proxy for the ex-ante probability of
winning the competition, creating a subgroup of “first losers". These countries are assumed to be
affected by the negative news of the IOC decision in a stronger way than the other losers. For each
country in the sample, we take the main stock market index as a measure for the entire domestic
market. If the common major indices do not have a sufficiently long history, the respective Datas-
tream Index is used5. The world market portfolio is represented by the MSCI World Index. To
obtain a solid base for this analysis, we include the Olympic Games from 1988 to 2014. Conse-
quently, the results are based on 15 events. This series could not be extended further to the past due
to either the lack of competition (one single applicant in Summer 1984 and Winter 1980) or the lack
of existing stock exchanges in the winning communist countries (Summer 1980, Winter 1984). For
5The considered indices are available from the authors upon request.
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a cross-country analysis of cumulative abnormal return, we collect data on the percentage of the
individual country GDP relative to the world GDP from the International Macroeconomic Data Set
of the Economic Research Service6.
Our analysis reveals that, on average, the stock markets of the countries which are awarded the
Olympic Games (Summer Games and Winter Games jointly) tend to exhibit significantly positive
abnormal returns in the days following the announcement7. This is especially true for the Olympic
Summer Games, whereas the effect cannot be found to be significant if only the Olympic Winter
Games are considered. As Table I shows, these results apply irrespective of whether the event
window is chosen to be [τ1 = 0, τ2 = 1],[τ1 = 0, τ2 = 2] or [τ1 = 0, τ2 = 5]8. Our results are in line
with economic intuition: Domestic corporations in the host country are expected to take advantage
of the substantial public and private spending in the years prior to a mega sports event. Since the
budget and public interest for the Olympic Summer Games typically exceed that for the Winter
Games, the stock market reaction is expected to be stronger for Summer Games.
An opposite reasoning can be made for the unsuccessful candidate cities. Before the IOC has
announced its decision, the impact of the Olympic Games was incorporated (weighted with a
probability) in the stock prices. Since the final IOC decision means for these countries that public
spending on infrastructure due to Olympics will not occur, investors have to reassess the value of
the domestic corporations. This effect might be particularly large if the loosing city was attributed a
high ex-ante probability of being awarded the Olympic Games. Therefore, besides the entire group
of losers, we consider a group of “first losers" of each announcement9. The computation for the
entire group of losers brings an additional complication: multiple losers of the same announcement
create cross correlation in returns which violates the underlying zero covariance assumption in
6See http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/ for details.
7The event window included the day when the IOC announcement was first absorbed by the market as well as
the subsequent n = τ2 − τ1 trading days. Since the IOC announcement is typically made in the evening (local time),
we accounted for the trading hours of the respective stock exchanges by starting the event window at the subsequent
trading day unless time zone effects allowed the information to enter the stock exchange on the announcement day
itself.
8For larger event windows up to [τ1 = 0, τ2 = 9], the impact continues to be positive on average. Beyond
[τ1 = 0, τ2 = 5], however, the results are not significant any more.
9To measure which losing candidate was attributed the highest winning probability (ex ante), we use the number
of votes in the committee as a proxy (which is an ex-post measure). Accordingly, the city with the second highest
number is chosen as the “first loser". Source: http://www.aldaver.com/votes.html, accessed on July 28th, 2008.
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Equation (3) (see MacKinlay 1997). Therefore we build portfolios of losers for each event to
perform the test over the sample of portfolios10. Both for all losers as well as for the first losers,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns for all considered event windows.
Intuitively, the variation in the cumulative abnormal return at the announcement date might partly
be explained by the size of the economy of the candidates. To test this hypothesis, we regress cu-
mulative abnormal returns (CARi) on the size of the economy (with OLS, using heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors). The size variable is taken as the percentage of the individual country GDP
relative to the world GDP in the announcement year. Since only winners have significant abnormal
returns, we restrict our regression analysis to this subgroup. Table II reports the results. The size of
the winner negatively and significantly relates to its cumulative abnormal return. This is consistent
with the intuition that winning the bid to host the Olympic Games is expected to have a relatively
larger economic impact for small economies than for large ones. This result continues to hold true
if we include a dummy variable for the Summer Games.
4 Conclusion
We investigate stock market reactions to the IOC announcement of the city hosting the Olympic
Games. Based on an event-study methodology, the abnormal returns after the announcements indi-
cate a significantly positive effect of hosting the Olympic Summer Games. This effect is negatively
related to the size of the economy of the winning country. Since stock markets are assumed to re-
flect the expectations about the economic outlook, the Olympic Summer Games are considered to
have a positive impact on the economy of the host countries.
10Ignoring the cross correlation among losers and basing the results on the individual countries instead of on port-
folio yield qualitatively similar results.
7
Table I
Cumulative abnormal returns for various event windows:
Note: This table reports the average cumulated abnormal returns CAR, the corresponding standard errors and
the t-statistics for the subgroups of the winners, the losers and the first losers. The analysis is performed for the
Winter Games, the Summer Games, and both jointly. Abnormal returns are computed on the basis of the market
model Rit = αi + βiRmt + it, where the parameters are obtained from the estimation window [−241,−41]. Various
event windows are reported. The average cumulated abnormal returns across all observations is computed by
CAR(τ1, τ2) = 1N
∑N
i=1 CARi(τ1, τ2) =
1
N
∑N
i=1
∑τ2
τ=τ1
ARiτ.
Panel A
Event window [0,1] Event window [0,2]
CAR Std_CAR t_Stat CAR Std_CAR t_Stat
All Games
Winner 0.011 0.004 2.443 0.014 0.005 2.594
Loser -0.000 0.004 -0.038 0.002 0.005 0.432
First_loser 0.002 0.008 0.179 0.008 0.010 0.811
Summer Game
Winner 0.019 0.006 3.434 0.024 0.007 3.407
Loser -0.003 0.005 -0.671 0.002 0.006 0.301
First_loser -0.000 0.013 -0.029 0.007 0.016 0.449
Winter Game
Winner 0.003 0.006 0.428 0.005 0.008 0.639
Loser 0.002 0.006 0.386 0.002 0.008 0.321
First_loser 0.004 0.009 0.480 0.010 0.011 0.947
Panel B
Event window [0,5] Event window [0,9]
CAR Std_CAR t_Stat CAR Std_CAR t_Stat
All Games
Winner 0.016 0.007 2.098 0.005 0.010 0.488
Loser -0.002 0.007 -0.226 -0.005 0.009 -0.524
First_loser -0.004 0.015 -0.254 -0.006 0.019 -0.338
Summer Game
Winner 0.024 0.010 2.438 0.012 0.013 0.946
Loser -0.003 0.008 -0.410 -0.007 0.010 -0.661
First_loser -0.016 0.023 -0.725 -0.025 0.029 -0.845
Winter Game
Winner 0.008 0.011 0.763 -0.002 0.014 -0.116
Loser -0.000 0.011 -0.005 -0.003 0.014 -0.199
First_loser 0.014 0.015 0.937 0.019 0.019 0.988
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Table II
Regression results (event window [0, 5])
Note: The equation CARi = a + b1S hareGDPi + i corresponds to Model(1), whereas an additional dummy for
the Summer Games is included into Model(2). The estimates are obtained with OLS, and the heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors are given in parentheses below. Significance levels: ∗ = 10%, ∗∗ = 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ = 1%.
Variable Model (1) Model (2)
Share of GDP -0.001 -0.001
(0.000)** (0.000)*
Summer Game 0.014
(0.012)
Constant 0.023 0.016
(0.008)** (0.010)
R-squared 0.19 0.26
9
References
Berman, G., R. Brooks, and S. Davidson, 2000, The Sydney Olympic Games announcement and
Australian stock market reaction, Applied Economics Letters 7, 781–784.
Kasimati, E., 2003, Economic aspects and the summer olympics: a review of related research,
International Journal of Tourism Research 5, 433–444.
MacKinlay, A.C., 1997, Event studies in economics and finance, Journal of Economic Literature
35, 13–39.
Martins, A.M., and A.P. Serra, 2007, Market impact of international sporting and cultural events,
Working Papers 0720, International Association of Sports Economists.
Mirman, M., and R. Sharma, 2008, Stock market reaction to Olympic Games announcement,
Applied Economics Letters 99999, 1–4.
Veraros, N., E. Kasimati, and P. Dawson, 2004, The 2004 olympic games announcement and its
effect on the athens and milan stock exchanges, Applied Economics Letters 11, 749–753.
10
